Thursday, June 11, 2015

ALBANIA Redux



Mountainous Albania has most often been part of other people’s empires: the ancient Greeks, Romans, and Byzantines all held some or all of Albania under their sway, as did the Ottoman Empire from the 15th century until 1913. Many Albanians converted to Islam as they adjusted to life as an Ottoman province. Albania became an independent principality in 1913 as a result of the First and Second Balkan Wars. It sank into anarchy during World War I, but its precarious sovereignty was widely recognized after the war and confirmed in 1921 by agreement among Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia. All those states coveted some Albanian territory, but they could not agree on how to partition the country. Albania was proclaimed a republic in 1925, but then turned back to monarchy under King Zog I. It was invaded by Italy on April 7, 1939, in a long-contemplated but still impulsive act of aggression ordered by Benito Mussolini. Minor resistance delayed even the poorly prepared Italians only long enough for the royal family to flee into exile. Ethnic Albanian resistance began in neighboring Kosovo. Matériel aid was provided by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), but nationalist resistance flagged with German occupation of Kosovo and much of Yugoslavia from April 1941.

Albanian Communists launched a small-scale guerrilla campaign in the mountains following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. Led by Enver Hoxha, they were also assisted by Tito’s Communist partisan movement operating in Yugoslavia. A few nationalists and other non-Communists, mainly organized around family and clan associations, began a separate resistance in the south of Albania. Tribal-based resistance was organized in the center of the country. British agents coordinated only minimal supplies to the Albanian resistance and so exercised little real influence. Instead, ancient internal rivalries and a fast-moving military situation drove events in 1943–1944. The overthrow of Mussolini and looming surrender of Italy was critical, provoking uprisings across Albania. Two Italian divisions surrendered to Albanian partisans and were disarmed. Others simply fled. Some Italian Communists and antifascists joined the Albanian partisans. Other Italian troops continued to fight alongside German units, which poured into Albania in September to secure the country for the Axis and keep open supply and communications routes to German forces in Greece. Typical Nazi techniques of mass reprisal for the smallest act of resistance soon cowed most of the population. A Nazi-puppet regime was set up in Tirana. It had a presence in a few other towns, but most of the countryside remained no-go territory for Axis troops. The resistance split and a multisided civil war ensued when Hoxha and the Communists turned against all other Albanian resisters as German defeat approached outside the country. This confused situation allowed German forces retreating from Greece to pass through Albania with minimal interference during September 1944. Hoxha’s partisans took control of Albania, with Yugoslav support, as the Germans departed. A quixotic Stalinist regime was established in which Hoxha ruled as absolute dictator until his death in 1985.

Winter War (1939–1940)



The first Five-Year Plans triggered a massive buildup of Soviet aviation, including many airplanes of indigenous design. Among them were manoeuvrable fighter biplanes, such as the Polikarpov I-15 and I-15 bis; the first cantilever monoplane with retractable landing gear to enter squadron service, the Polikarpov I-16; and a variety of bombers, including the Tupolev TB-7, SB-2/SB-3, and DB-3.Yet the Soviets failed to develop a reliable long-range bomber force. The established Soviet concept of air warfare envisioned the use of airpower predominantly in close support missions and under operational control of the ground forces command.

The Red Army Air Force under the command of Yakov Alksnis during 1931–1937 developed into a semi-independent military service with a combat potential, good training, and a logistics infrastructure spreading from European Russia into Central Asia and the Far East. Still, the Red Army Air Force exhibited marked deficiencies in several local conflicts (e.g., against the Chinese in 1929 and in the Spanish civil war, 1936–1939). In contrast, during the 1937–1939 air conflicts with Japan (China, Lake Khasan, Khalkin Gol) the Soviets effectively challenged the Japanese air domination and provided decisive close air support in the campaigns on Soviet and Mongolian borders. During the Winter War with Finland (1939–1940), however, the Red Air Force suffered heavy losses due to inflexibility of organization, its command- and-control structure, poor training of personnel, and deficiency of equipment.

The Soviet-Finnish conflict in the winter of 1939–1940, mostly over strategically important territories of the Karelian Isthmus. The air operations demonstrated the abilities and constraints of airpower in action in severe weather and over difficult and heavily wooded terrain. At the outbreak of hostilities, the Soviet air force had assembled about 900 aircraft, expecting an easy and quick campaign. Then Finnish air force had 162 mostly obsolete aircraft of all types.

Enjoying permanent air superiority in the course of the war, the Red Air Force was able to secure vulnerable rear areas from air strikes but failed to eliminate in a surprise strike the dispersed Finnish combat aircraft on the ground. Soviet airpower was engaged primarily in close support, air cover, and airlifting of assaulting troops in the Karelian Isthmus, some limited air operations in the Arctic area, as well as bombing raids on more than 160 rear targets.

Despite large-scale employment of bombers in daytime and clear-weather raids, the Soviets were unable to undermine Finnish defenses, economic life, supply traffic, and morale. This was due to wintertime navigation problems, bombing inaccuracy, and the fierce Finnish air defense, which claimed 275–314 Soviet air losses (more than half of them bombers).

The Finns also used fighters energetically and adapted to winter conditions: They equipped fighters with skis for takeoffs and landings on ice and snow. Their pilots demonstrated a higher level of combat skills compared to the Russian pilots. During the war, Finland received 240 aircraft of all types as well as volunteer pilots from Western countries, but massive aid was compromised by politics and logistical difficulties.

The Soviets massed reinforcements (1,500–2,000 planes) in January-February 1940 and introduced some operational and tactical changes (night-time and poor-weather bombing raids as well as fighter escorts). Nevertheless, the war was won by the Soviets mostly on the ground due to the dramatic disparity of forces involved. Moreover, the evident failure of the Soviet air campaign was one of the primary reasons the war went on for as long as it did. The total Russian war losses were 594 aircraft; the Finnish air force lost 62 planes from all causes.

References Engle, Eloise, and Lauri Paanen. The Winter War: The Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1939–1940. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1990. Luukanen, Eino. Fighter over Finland: The Memoirs of a Fighter Pilot. London: Macdonald, 1963.

Belgium 1940 Armour



M39 Pantserwagen: When the Battle of the Netherlands started on 10 May 1940, of the twelve vehicles manufactured, four were in Eindhoven with DAF, eight at Delft; of the last, two were still lacking their main armament and none were fully completed, though some had been equipped with machine-guns. No crews were fully trained. The base at Delft, in between the Dutch seat of government The Hague and the port of Rotterdam, had been seen as a safe rear-area location at the very heart of the Dutch National Redoubt, the Fortress Holland. On the early morning of 10 May however, these two major cities were assaulted by German parachutists and airborne troops attempting to capture the Dutch government. The attack did not come as a total surprise; as it had been feared that a German invasion was imminent, Supreme Command had ordered several security measures on 8 May, among which the formation of a small cavalry security force from Delft depot units, the Depotdetachement Bewakingstroepen Cavalerie, to guard The Hague, to which a DAF M39 platoon was added. In the night of 9–10 May, these three M39s were parked at a base in The Hague. As another base in the city had already been bombed, the cars were on 10 May initially ordered to seek cover from aerial observation in the Haagse Bos, a park.

The German attempt to seize The Hague failed, partly because Landsverk armoured cars destroyed many Ju-52 transport planes and thereby blocked the runway of the main city airfield, Ypenburg. As a result the next waves of planes landed on meadows and roads, dispersing the airborne troops into many small groups which, unable to be reinforced, in the following days tried to break out towards Rotterdam, the southern part of which city was firmly in German hands. In the confused situation the platoon in the afternoon of 10 May was ordered to convoy a munition truck to Delft. At a Dutch roadblock the commander of one car was killed, both sides mistaking each other for Germans. Finally arriving in Delft, two of the armoured cars were in the late afternoon ordered to support an advance of some depot companies to the south, in the direction of Rotterdam, that soon was blocked by enemy fire. Lacking bulletproof tyres, the cars were held back, only supporting the troops by shelling enemy positions at a distance. Though this was forbidden, one of the cars fired shells in a nine o'clock or three o'clock position of the turret; the lateral recoil forces distorted the front wheel suspension so severely that the car could no longer be steered. Repair proving impossible, the vehicle was, somewhat prematurely, on 11 May destroyed by its own crew to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. Later that evening the second car also showed a defect, probably a main armament malfunction, causing it to be withdrawn the next day to the base. In the same evening of 10 May the third car, III-2203, that experimentally had been fitted with bulletproof Michelin tyres, positioned itself on the southern edge of Delft, without making enemy contact, but in vain trying to shoot down a low-flying German aircraft with the main gun.

On 11 May III-2203 was ordered to support an advance over the Delft-Rotterdam highway. At first this met little enemy resistance, the main problem being that the car was fired upon by a fighter aircraft that the vehicle commander recognised as a Dutch Fokker G.1. Then several Junkers Ju 52s were encountered, that had landed on the road and were now used by the German airborne troops as cover in the open polder landscape. Of one undamaged plane the DAF M39 shot off the engine; another, stuck in a ditch, was put on fire by some 37 mm HE-shells, fired at distance. The fire generated an enormous black smoke cloud, forcing the armoured car to break off the attack. The armour of the car during the action easily deflected enemy machine-gun rounds. By noon most of the Dutch infantry was withdrawn to rest and eat; during the afternoon the armoured car again made a probing attack against the cluster of Ju 52s. The commander decided to hold his fire and approached within forty metres of the enemy position, to provoke a reaction. Suddenly the vehicle was hit from all sides by a hail of bullets, some of these penetrated the thinner turret armour. Now responding with its main gun and hull machine-gun the M39 forced the Germans to take cover, but the gunner suddenly reported: "I am wounded" and sagged bleeding to the floor of the fighting compartment. The car drove back to the Dutch positions to seek medical assistance for the gunner, who was hospitalised. At a civil garage in Delft some brake malfunction was repaired. Most ammunition had been expended.

On 12 May the commander of III-2203 discovered that all trained crews had been moved to The Hague. Most of that day and the morning of 13 May were used to find a truck and fetch a replacement gunner and new munition from The Hague. In the afternoon the vehicle protected the headquarters of the 1st Infantry Division at Rijswijk. On 14 May the car supported an attempt to eliminate the largest remaining pocket of German airborne troops, that had gathered around Major-General Hans Graf von Sponeck at Overschie, together with a Landsverk M38 armoured car from 2e Eskadron Pantserwagens. During the advance the clutch of III-2203 malfunctioned and the car returned to Delft for repairs. Rejoining the fight in the afternoon, III-2003 first took a civilian, fled from the village, on-board to point out the exact German positions. Shortly afterwards the attacking Dutch troops witnessed the devastating bombardment of Rotterdam, just south of Overschie. Continuing to advance nevertheless, the two armoured cars were suddenly hit by antitank rifle fire and returned to the Dutch lines. It transpired that the M39 had been penetrated twice low in the side hull armour, without the projectiles doing any damage or even being noticed; a third round had been stopped by the thin strip of reinforcing steel around the turret base that doubled the normal armour thickness. Rotterdam capitulating as a result of the carpet bombing, III-2203 was withdrawn to The Hague.

In The Hague also the five DAF M39s were present, two of them without main armament that had not been used in the Depotdetachement Bewakingstroepen Cavalerie. In the morning of 10 May these vehicles had been readied and then moved to the headquarters of the Commander Fortress Holland. In the subsequent days they had remained in the city, sometimes patrolling the streets or responding to the many false alarms about presumed Fifth Column activities. In one incident, on 11 May, a M39 had set fire to some railway wagons where, probably groundlessly, German paratroopers were suspected to have hidden.

Fearing a further destruction of the Dutch cities, the Dutch supreme commander Henri Winkelman at 16:50 ordered his troops to destroy their equipment and then surrender themselves to the Germans. In the evening of 14 May it was accordingly attempted to disable some DAF M39s by driving them into the sea at Scheveningen. Two vehicles indeed reached the waves, a third got stuck on the boulevard stairway to the beach.

Besides the eight cars at Delft, on 10 May four M39s were present in the DAF factory at Eindhoven. In the morning Wim van Doorne, the brother of Hub, phoned the military authorities in The Hague to remind them of this fact, because the German invaders might soon overrun the area. He was advised to contact the military commander of the forces in North Brabant province. The latter asked DAF to drive the cars to Vught, where they were transferred to the 4e Compagnie Korps Motordienst, a motorisation unit of his main force, the Peeldivisie, that would remain in the province. As a result the vehicles were not evacuated to the Fortress Holland. A persistent story that the M39s had tried to reach the North but were blocked by the German paratroopers having captured the bridges at Moerdijk is thus likely apocryphal. Probably the armoured cars accompanied the Peeldivisie staff to Princenhage near Breda in the night of 10–11 May. Lacking full crews or munition they were apparently later abandoned in the west of the province when the remnants of the division withdrew to Zealand on 13 and 14 May.

Vickers-Armstrong Utility Tractor: These tractors were manufactured under license from Vickers-Armstrong by the Belgian company Familleheureux in two version, infantry and cavalry.

Renault FT: 1920-2 Two-man light tank Seventy-five vehicles acquired. Armed with either a 37mm gun or MG.

Carden-Lloyd M1934: 1935 Two-man light tank Forty-two vehicles acquired — High conical turret — Armed in Belgium with a 13.2mm Hotchkiss air-cooled MG Belgian designation: T15 France

AMC-35 (ACGI): 1937 Three-man medium tank Twelve vehicles acquired — Fitted with a Belgian-made turret housing a 47mm A/Tk gun and a 13.2mm MG. Belgian designation: Auto-mitrailleuse du Corps de Cavalerie