In the 1930s, two controversies hindered
Finnish aircraft acquisition. The first was the issue of whether fighters or
bombers should have priority (the need for fighters seeming paramount). The
second was the country from which to purchase aircraft. The head of the Defense
Council, Carl Mannerheim, favored Germany, and the air force commander, Colonel
Jarl Lundquist (later a lieutenant general), favored Britain. Mannerheim
stressed the danger of air attacks on Finnish cities when arguing for more
funds for the air force, but he gave priority to air support for ground forces
when war came.
In September 1939, the Finnish Air Force
(FAF) had only 36 modern interceptors (Dutch Fokker D-XXIs) and 21 bombers (14
Bristol Blenheims and 7 Junkers K430s). Lundquist deployed his limited fighter
assets forward to protect the army and defend as much Finnish air space as
possible. Following the Soviet invasion of Finland in November 1939, Finnish
bombers attacked airfields and supported ground forces. In late December 1939,
the FAF was able to purchase additional Fokker fighters, but its best aircraft
came in the form of Morane-Saulnier MS-406s purchased from France. The Finns
purchased additional Blenheims, U.S. Brewster F2A Buffalos (the Finns enjoyed
considerable success with this much-maligned aircraft), Italian Fiat G-50s, and
additional MS 406s. Most arrived too late for the war.
During this Finnish-Soviet War of
1939–1940, also called the Winter War, the FAF supposedly accounted for
approximately 200 Soviet aircraft, and more than 300 others were destroyed by
antiaircraft fire or on the ground. Finnish losses during the war amounted to
53 aircraft.
Finnish
Air Force in the Winter War
At the beginning of the war, Finland had a
very small air force, with only 114 combat airplanes fit for duty. Therefore,
Finnish air missions were very limited and fighter aircraft were mainly used to
repel Soviet bombers. Old-fashioned and few in numbers, Finnish aircraft could
not offer support to the Finnish ground troops. In spite of aircraft losses
throughout the war, the Finnish Air Force grew by 50 percent by the end of the
war. Most new aircraft shipments arrived during January 1940.
Finnish fighter pilots often dove into
Soviet formations that outnumbered them ten or even twenty times. Finnish
fighters shot down 240 confirmed Soviet aircraft, against the Finnish loss of
53. A Finnish forward air base often consisted of only a frozen lake, a
windsock, a telephone set and some tents. Air-raid warnings were given by
Finnish women organized by the Lotta Svärd. Finnish antiaircraft gunners shot
down between 314 to 444 Soviet aircraft.
Finnish
aircraft
At the start of hostilities, the Finnish
Air Force had 146 aircraft of all types at its disposal. The primary fighter
aircraft were 15 Bristol Bulldog IVs, which had entered service in 1935, and 41
of the more modern Fokker D.XXI. There were also 18 license-built Bristol
Blenheim bombers. In 1939, an order had been placed in Italy for 25 Fiat G.50
fighters; two were being assembled in Sweden when the war broke out.
During the war, a number of aircraft were
ordered from abroad:
30 Gloster Gladiator II biplane fighters from the United Kingdom
12 Bristol Blenheim IV bombers from the United Kingdom
30 Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 fighters from France
44 Brewster 239 fighters from the United States
22 Gloster Gauntlet trainers from the United Kingdom
10 Fiat G.50 fighters from Italy
In air combat, Finland used the
"finger four" formation (four planes split into two pairs, one flying
low and the other high, with each plane fighting independently of the others,
yet supporting its wingman in combat), which was superior to the Soviet tactic
of three fighters flying in a delta formation. This formation and the credo of
Finnish pilots to always attack, no matter the odds, contributed to the failure
of Soviet bombers to inflict substantial damage against Finnish positions and
population centres.
#
In 1941, when Finland again went to war
with the Soviet Union (the Finnish-Soviet War of 1941–1944, also called the
Continuation War), Finland’s air force had increased substantially. It
possessed 144 modern fighters (a mixture of U.S., British, French, Dutch, and
Italian planes); 44 British and ex-Soviet bombers; and 63 mostly British and
German reconnaissance planes. Once the Continuation War began, Finnish access
to aircraft from other nations except Germany was cut off. The Finns did have
their own aircraft industry, which produced limited numbers of aircraft
including the VL Myrsky II fighter.
Continuation
War 1941–44
The Finnish Air Force was better prepared
for the Continuation War. It had been considerably strengthened and consisted
of some 550 aircraft, though many were considered second-rate and thus
"exportable" by their countries of origin. Finland purchased a large
number of aircraft during the Winter War, but few of those reached service
during the short conflict. Politics also played a factor, since Hitler did not
wish to antagonize the Soviet Union by allowing aircraft exports through
German-controlled territory during the conflict. New aircraft types were in
place by the time hostilities with Soviet Union resumed in 1941. Small numbers
of Hawker Hurricanes arrived from the United Kingdom, Morane-Saulnier M.S.406s
from France, Fiat G.50s from Italy, a few dozen Curtiss Hawk 75s captured by
the Germans in France and Norway then sold to Finland, when Germany began
warming up its ties with Finland, and numerous Brewster B239s from the neutral
USA strengthened the FiAF. The FiAF proved capable of holding its own in the
upcoming battles with the Red Air Force. Older models, like the Fokker D.XXI
and Gloster Gladiator, were replaced in front-line combat units with the new
aircraft.
The FiAF's main mission was to achieve air
superiority over Finland and prevent Soviet air power from reinforcing their
front lines. The fighter squadrons were very successful in the Finnish
offensive of 1941. A stripped-down, more maneuverable, and significantly
lightened version of the American Brewster B239 "Buffalo" was the FiAF's
main fighter until 1943. Results with this fighter were very good, even though
the type was considered to be a failure in the US Navy and with British Far
East forces. In the Finnish use, the Brewster had a victory rate of 32:1 – 459
kills to 15 losses. German Bf 109s replaced the Brewster as the primary
front-line fighter of the FiAF in 1943, though the Buffalos continued in
secondary roles until the end of the wars. Other types, especially the Italian
Fiat G.50 and Curtiss Hawk 75 also proved capable in the hands of well-trained
Finnish pilots. Various Russian designs also saw action when lightly damaged
"kills" were repaired and made airworthy.
Dornier Do 17s (received as a gift from
Hermann Göring in 1942) and Junkers Ju 88s improved the bombing capability of
the Finnish Air Force. The bomber force was also strengthened with a number of
captured Soviet bombers, which had been taken in large numbers by the Germans
during Operation Barbarossa. The bomber units flew assorted missions with
varying results, but a large part of their time was spent in training, waiting
to use their aircraft until the time required it. Thus the bomber squadrons of
Flying Regiment 4 were ready for the summer battles of 1944, which included for
example the Battle of Tali-Ihantala.
While the FiAF was successful in its
mission, the conditions were not easy. Spare parts for the FiAF planes were
scarce — parts from the US (Buffalo & Hawk), Britain (Hurricanes), and
Italy (G.50) were unavailable for much of the war. Repairs took often a long
time, and the State Aircraft Factory was burdened with restoration/repair of
Soviet war booty planes, foreign aircraft with many hours of flight time, and
the development of indigenous Finnish fighter types. Also, one damaged bomber
took up workshop space equalling three fighters.
Finland was required to expel or intern
remaining German forces as part of its peace agreement with the Soviets in
mid-1944. As a result, the final air battles were against retreating Luftwaffe
units.
The Finnish Air Force did not bomb any
civilian targets during either war. Curiously, overflying Soviet towns and
bases was also forbidden, as to avoid any unneeded provocations and to spare
equipment.
According to Kalevi Keskinen's and Kari
Stenman's book "Aerial Victories 1–2", the Finnish Air Force shot
down 1,621 Soviet aircraft while losing 210 own aircraft during the
Continuation War 1941–44.
Finnish Air Force strategy stressed
aggressiveness; isolated fighters usually attacked no matter the number of
Soviet aircraft. The FAF employed a blue swastika marking (no relation to the
Nazi version) for national identification. The Luftwaffe and FAF cooperated in
this conflict, although neither could prevent Soviet air raids into Finnish
territory nor completely screen the Finnish army from air attacks.
References
Kirby, D. G. Finland in the Twentieth Century.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979. Tillotson, H. M. Finland at
Peace and War, 1918–1993. Wilby, UK: Michael Russell, 1993. Trotter, William R.
A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish War of 1939–40. Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin
Books, 1991.
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