The development of a staff study by Group
XXI (Army of Norway) for operations in Finland based on Directive 21. The study
was expanded by Marshal von Brauchitsch on January 16 to include examining the
feasibility of a German–Finnish southeast drive in the area of Lake Ladoga,
Lake Onega, and the White Sea. The Army of Norway was asked to make
recommendations for supply operations and command relationships. This study,
begun in late December, was completed on January 27, 1941, and given the code
name Silberfuchs (Silver Fox).
The Finnish Army would carry the main
burden of the attack. The bulk of their forces would be concentrated in the
southeast for an attack east of Lake Ladoga towards the Svir River. The Finnish
Army was to defend the frontier north of Lake Ladoga with relatively weak forces,
and additionally was responsible for the security of the coast and the Ă…land
Islands. The staff study assumed that the overall command in Finland would be
given to the Finns because they were providing the preponderance of forces.
The planning and preparation for Renntier
was not wasted, but expanded by making it part of the operations assigned to
Mountain Corps Norway. The main German attack was a drive from Rovaniemi
through Salla to Kandalaksha on the White Sea. This drive would cut the
Murmansk Railroad and sever lines of communication between Soviet forces in
Murmansk and on the Kola Peninsula from the rest of the Soviet Union.
The forces allocated to the main drive
consisted of one German and one Finnish corps. The German corps—XXXVI
Corps—consisted of two infantry divisions and SS Kampfgruppe Nord reinforced by
a tank battalion, a machinegun battalion, an antitank battalion, an artillery
battalion, and engineers. Kampfgruppe Nord would provide security for the
assembly of the two infantry divisions. Part of the German forces would turn
north when they reached Kandalaksha. In conjunction with one reinforced
mountain division advancing from Pechenga towards Murmansk, the forces that
turned north would destroy the Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula and capture
Murmansk.
The Finnish corps—III Corps—consisted of
two divisions (3rd and 6th) plus border guards. Its main mission was to launch
a secondary attack on the German right flank against Ukhta (Uhtua) and then on
towards Kem (Kemi) on the White Sea. This drive, if successful, would also cut
the Murmansk Railroad. The bulk of the German forces advancing on Kandalaksha
would turn south after reaching that town and link up with the Finns in the Kem
area for a joint drive southward behind the left wing of the main Finnish Army.
The operations proposed in the Silberfuchs
staff study assumed that Sweden would allow German troops and supplies to cross
its territory from Norway to Finland. It was planned that five divisions (later
increased to seven) would be left in Norway for its defense and that the Army
of Norway would supply all German units. This would involve large supply,
construction, and transportation assets and many of these would have to come
from Germany.
The
OKH Operation Order
The German Army issued an operation order
at the end of January for operations in Finland using the Army of Norway staff
study as its basis. Hitler approved the order on February 3, 1941.
The OKH order assigned the defense of
Norway as the highest priority of the Army of Norway. Only forces over and
above the requirement for the priority mission would be used in Finland where
the mission of German forces was limited to the defense of the Pechanga area
until Finland entered the war. At that time the order laid out two possible
courses of action. The first was that proposed in the Army of Norway staff
study, while the second would come into being if Sweden refused transit of
troops. If this materialized, the Germans would launch an attack through
Pechenga with the mission of capturing Murmansk.
As far as the mission of the Finnish Army,
some disagreements had developed and certain things remained unresolved.
Finnish participation in the planning had been indirect and remained so because
Hitler’s order on February 3, 1941 specified that all potential allies should
be brought into the planning process only when German intentions could no
longer be disguised. The Army order gave the Finnish Army the mission of
covering German deployments in central Finland and the capturing of Hanko. The
Germans wanted the bulk of the Finnish Army to undertake offensive operations
towards the southeast when German Army Group North crossed the Dvina River. The
Germans accepted offensives on both sides of Lake Ladoga as long as the main
effort was made on the east side of that lake. The Finnish Army was expected to
make a sweep around the eastern shore of the lake and isolate Leningrad by
affecting a junction with Army Group North in the Tikhvin area.
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