The first Five-Year Plans triggered a
massive buildup of Soviet aviation, including many airplanes of indigenous
design. Among them were manoeuvrable fighter biplanes, such as the Polikarpov
I-15 and I-15 bis; the first cantilever monoplane with retractable landing gear
to enter squadron service, the Polikarpov I-16; and a variety of bombers,
including the Tupolev TB-7, SB-2/SB-3, and DB-3.Yet the Soviets failed to
develop a reliable long-range bomber force. The established Soviet concept of
air warfare envisioned the use of airpower predominantly in close support
missions and under operational control of the ground forces command.
The Red Army Air Force under the command of
Yakov Alksnis during 1931–1937 developed into a semi-independent military
service with a combat potential, good training, and a logistics infrastructure
spreading from European Russia into Central Asia and the Far East. Still, the
Red Army Air Force exhibited marked deficiencies in several local conflicts
(e.g., against the Chinese in 1929 and in the Spanish civil war, 1936–1939). In
contrast, during the 1937–1939 air conflicts with Japan (China, Lake Khasan,
Khalkin Gol) the Soviets effectively challenged the Japanese air domination and
provided decisive close air support in the campaigns on Soviet and Mongolian
borders. During the Winter War with Finland (1939–1940), however, the Red Air
Force suffered heavy losses due to inflexibility of organization, its command-
and-control structure, poor training of personnel, and deficiency of equipment.
The Soviet-Finnish conflict in the winter
of 1939–1940, mostly over strategically important territories of the Karelian
Isthmus. The air operations demonstrated the abilities and constraints of
airpower in action in severe weather and over difficult and heavily wooded
terrain. At the outbreak of hostilities, the Soviet air force had assembled
about 900 aircraft, expecting an easy and quick campaign. Then Finnish air
force had 162 mostly obsolete aircraft of all types.
Enjoying permanent air superiority in the
course of the war, the Red Air Force was able to secure vulnerable rear areas
from air strikes but failed to eliminate in a surprise strike the dispersed
Finnish combat aircraft on the ground. Soviet airpower was engaged primarily in
close support, air cover, and airlifting of assaulting troops in the Karelian
Isthmus, some limited air operations in the Arctic area, as well as bombing
raids on more than 160 rear targets.
Despite large-scale employment of bombers
in daytime and clear-weather raids, the Soviets were unable to undermine
Finnish defenses, economic life, supply traffic, and morale. This was due to
wintertime navigation problems, bombing inaccuracy, and the fierce Finnish air
defense, which claimed 275–314 Soviet air losses (more than half of them
bombers).
The Finns also used fighters energetically
and adapted to winter conditions: They equipped fighters with skis for takeoffs
and landings on ice and snow. Their pilots demonstrated a higher level of
combat skills compared to the Russian pilots. During the war, Finland received
240 aircraft of all types as well as volunteer pilots from Western countries,
but massive aid was compromised by politics and logistical difficulties.
The Soviets massed reinforcements
(1,500–2,000 planes) in January-February 1940 and introduced some operational
and tactical changes (night-time and poor-weather bombing raids as well as
fighter escorts). Nevertheless, the war was won by the Soviets mostly on the
ground due to the dramatic disparity of forces involved. Moreover, the evident
failure of the Soviet air campaign was one of the primary reasons the war went
on for as long as it did. The total Russian war losses were 594 aircraft; the
Finnish air force lost 62 planes from all causes.
References Engle, Eloise, and Lauri Paanen. The Winter War: The Russo-Finnish
Conflict, 1939–1940. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1990. Luukanen, Eino.
Fighter over Finland: The Memoirs of a Fighter Pilot. London: Macdonald, 1963.
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